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- Introduction
- Lessons Learnt
- Background
- The Story
- The Aftermath
- Timeline
- Web Resources

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| This case study was written in August 2001 |  |
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Introduction
On April 6, 2001, Pacific Gas &
Electric (PG&E), one of the largest investor-owned utility companies in the
US, filed for bankruptcy protection after sustaining devastating financial
losses. Along with fellow utilities Southern California Edison (SCE) and San
Diego Gas & Electric (SDG&E), the company had suffered for more than a
year as a massive gap opened up between the rates that Californian utilities were
allowed to charge consumers, and the price they had to pay for supplies in the
wholesale electricity market.
The utilities werent the only ones in
pain. Companies that had sold electricity to them or lent them money found
themselves looking at billions of dollars in potential credit losses. Consumers
that depended on the utilities had to deal with uncertainty of supply as
rolling blackouts swept through one of the most economically vibrant regions of
the world. The debacle eventually threatened the health of the California
economy and became one of the first big political problems facing the newly
elected US president, George W Bush.
The biggest financial disaster in the US
energy industry since the oil crisis of the 1970s had begun five years earlier
with an optimistic plan to deregulate the states electric industry.
But the plan was based on several flawed
assumptions, which failed to predict the market behaviour of generators and
consumers. A potent mix of market, credit, regulatory and political risks led
to the unravelling of the plan and led to disaster for the utilities involved.
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Lessons Learnt
- If the structure of an industry or market changes, predictions of likely or unlikely market extremes can be far from the mark;
- It's often the interaction between risks market, credit, liquidity, regulatory that turns a survivable incident into a crisis;
- In a competitive market, players behave selfishly at critical moments: profit and self-preservation are the only real motivators;
- Dont rely on regulatory action as a form of worst-case market risk management, as gaps can open up between the motivations and powers of key regulators, and regulators' actions may be too little, too late;
- Its easy to find yourself in trouble in a physical commodity market. The California power crisis was unusual only in that a complete industry segment ended up in a corner, having first helped build the walls.
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Story background: wrong-headed reform triggers crisis
Between 1996 and 1998, California implemented
a plan to deregulate its electric industry, beginning with the wholesale
market, in the hope of pushing down its relatively high electricity prices.
Though the details were controversial, the move was broadly welcomed as a
strategy in which everyone would win. Utilities would sell their gas-fired
power plants to independent producers, making the electricity generation
process more efficient. Streamlined production and market forces would lower
the wholesale cost of power, saving money for the utilities, and these could
pass on the savings to consumers.
Under the plan, individuals and businesses
that bought their electricity from major utilities saw their rates fall by 10
per cent immediately after industry restructuring began, and many were
protected from future price spikes by rate caps. Yet, four years later, the
system fell apart as wholesale electricity prices spiralled out of control and
the major utilities found themselves struggling to pay for the power that
consumers demanded.
While there were other contributing
factors, most experts agree the crisis was born out of the partial nature of
the deregulation process, and the flawed assumptions underpinning it:
Assumption 1: Capping retail prices will protect consumers, but it is not necessary to restrict
wholesale prices.
This belief trapped retailers such as
PG&E and SCE when wholesale prices rose above the figure that had been used
to calculate retail rate caps. Consumers prices were set based on the belief
that wholesale prices would not rise above $55 per megawatt hour (MWh). In
1999, when the average price was $32/MWh, this figure seemed reasonable. During
the crisis, however, the average price was more than $200, and at some points
was as high as $1,900. Power retailers could not pass this increase along, and
were expected to absorb the difference between wholesale costs and their retail
intake.
Assumption 2: Wholesale prices will fall
if power plants are sold to competitive, independent generators.
Instead of streamlining the industry and ushering
in a golden age of efficiency and low pricing by electricity generators,
divesting power plants served only to leave utilities with few defences against
rising wholesale prices. They still controlled nuclear and hydroelectric
plants, but these facilities could not produce enough electricity to meet
demand, particularly in times of peak demand. So, when the companies that had
bought gas-driven power plants raised their prices, retailers had no choice but
to continue buying power from them.
Assumption 3: Long-term contracts
between producers and retailers are not needed; utilities can buy their power
on the spot market.
If the wholesale electricity market were
truly competitive, the spot market might have worked in this way though many
commentators believe that the utilities should have had more freedom to risk
manage their future financial exposures. But, since utilities were dependent
upon the generators that had bought their gas-fired power plants, and demand
proved much more flexible than supply for fundamental reasons we look at below,
a sellers market developed. Rather than keeping prices low, the wholesalers
behaved in the way for-profit companies usually behave: they tried to make a
profit. Controversy continues over whether they made use of their position in
the market their market power in an inappropriate manner.
Also, because electricity can be shipped
through wires to distant locations, the producers that now owned California
power plants were not constrained to sell their power only to the California
market. If they could get a better price in a different location, they would
sell their power to retailers in the other location.
Assumption 4: Cutting retail prices will
benefit consumers.
Cutting retail prices benefits consumers
wallets. The rate reduction did have a short-term economic benefit for
consumers, but in the long term, retail price cuts had the negative effect of
encouraging higher consumption of electricity. Consumers have little financial
incentive to control their use of inexpensive resources and, in this case,
demand for power rose to a level that has been very difficult to sustain.
Other factors help explain why the
deregulation plan went so spectacularly wrong. The first is the inadequacy of
Californias present generation facilities. The state does not have enough
power plants to keep up with rising demand, but it appears that constructing
new power plants is nearly as difficult as recreating dinosaurs from fossilized
DNA. Thus, little new capacity came on line in the decade before the crisis
erupted. In recent years, companies that have tried to build new facilities
have met with opposition from homeowners and communities that do not want to
live next to a power plant.
Meanwhile, environmental restrictions limit
the total amount of pollution that can be released by the states power plants,
and an individual plants permitted pollution level is determined by the
emissions vouchers it holds. New facilities cannot acquire emissions vouchers
unless they outbid existing facilities for them, or the existing plants
dramatically reduce their emissions (thereby freeing up vouchers for use by new
producers) or the state increases the number of vouchers available to
producers.
These long-term issues were exacerbated by
a series of unusually dry seasons in the US Northwest, a region that supplies
power to California from its hydroelectric facilities. Under normal
circumstances, these plants may have been able to sell enough extra electricity
to dampen the price spikes in the southern state. Although California was able
to buy some power from surrounding states, the supply was not enough to lower
wholesale prices.
Adding to the problem of insufficient
supply is instability within the distribution grid. At peak times, such as
during daytime working hours, the grid that transports power from generation
facilities to intermediate stations, and then to consumers, is placed under
great stress. If anything goes wrong, such as a bottleneck or breakdown in one
of the lines, blackouts can occur.
Then theres the rising price of natural
gas, which is used as a fuel in many power plants. Wholesale electricity prices
are sensitive to fluctuations in the cost of natural gas, and independent
generators have pointed to this factor as justification for the rising
wholesale price of power.
Finally, the government, which created the
untenable deregulation strategy in the first place, was slow to react after the
crisis emerged. As we describe below, although Californias woes provided ample
fodder for political debate, regulators did not cap wholesale prices until
2001, after the crisis had taken a heavy toll on both utilities and consumers.
That was partly because a dangerous gap had opened up between local and
national regulatory forces.
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC), which regulates US wholesale energy markets, believed the problems in
California were caused by local market rules, and that deploying federal price
caps would do long-term damage to market mechanisms in all deregulating states.
Meanwhile, the local Californian political and
regulatory forces, which had more immediate worries, preferred to see the
problem as price gouging by energy interests controlled from outside the state.
It saw a simple and instant solution in the form of price capping. Neither
position sat easily with the unique physical characteristics of power markets:
demand must be met immediately, but above a certain threshold, demand can only
be satisfied if players have made long-term decisions that ensure adequate
supply.
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The story: summer 2000 to summer 2001
With the scene set for trouble, the first
unmistakable signs of disaster surfaced in May 2000, as Californias power
reserves fell noticeably. On May 22, the independent system operator for the
Californian power system, Cal-ISO, declared the first of many Stage 2
electrical emergencies, when reserves dropped below 5 per cent.
By June, to avoid jeopardising the systems
stability, the ISO had started to ban work on any critical transmission or
generation infrastructure for periods of time. But by mid-month, peak demand in
the Bay area led to rotating outages for about 97,000 PG&E customers; on
June 22, the Californian Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) voted to allow
utilities to buy power from firms outside the PX wholesale market that formed a
key feature of the deregulated market.
Meanwhile, by July, SDG&E customers had
begun to receive electric bills that were significantly higher than those from
previous summers. SDG&E had, temporarily, escaped retail price caps after
fulfilling certain regulatory criteria, but PG&E and SCE had not. So while
the customers of the latter two utilitiesdid not immediately feel the impact of
the emergency in the form of price increases in their monthly electric bills,
their finances were left vulnerable. By the end of July, PG&E and SCEs
undercollections the gap between what they paid for power and what they
could charge their customers totalled $1.1 billion.
The debacle took on a national flavour in late
August, as President Clinton ordered the US Department of Health and Human
Services to release $2.6 million of emergency funds. This was to help pay the
electricity bills of low-income families, senior citizens and people with
disabilities, who could not afford them after SDG&Es rate increases.
By September 30, PG&E and SCEs
undercollections exceeded $2.3 billion, and Californias utilities were in deep
trouble. US energy secretary Bill Richardson had to intervene to oblige
credit-wary out-of-state suppliers to sell power to California.
By January 2001, SCE had suspended payments
to creditors and eliminated dividend payments, and SCEs and PG&Es credit
ratings were downgraded to junk status. The CPUC allowed the utilities to
raise their rates, but on January 17 rolling blackouts began, mainly hurting
customers on voluntary interruptible programmes. By the end of the month, US
Vice President Dick Cheney had been appointed head of a task force to address
the countrys energy problems.
On February 2, Californias governor, Gray
Davis, signed in a law allowing the state to purchase power under long-term
contracts to avoid more blackouts, and to authorise bond issues to pay for the
purchases. The Department of Water Resources was also authorised to use
taxpayers money to purchase electricity on behalf of the states consumers,
providing some relief to utilities. But FERC continued to resist imposing
wholesale price caps, arguing it was not the right solution. And on February
14, FERC ruled that California could not force private electricity generators
to sell power to utilities, without an assurance that the generators would
receive payment. Davis began to formulate plans to pump money into the
utilities in return for a state purchase of their transmission facilities.
Meanwhile, eight alternative energy
producers formed a creditors committee to discuss collection of SCEs $210
million debt. The firms claimed that they had not received payment for
purchases dating back to November 2000. On March 2, PG&E obtained a loan of
$1 billion to pay its creditors.
Desperate to cut summer energy consumption,
on March 13, Davis announced that households and businesses that reduced energy
consumption by 20 per cent, compared with their usage the previous summer,
would receive a rebate of 20 per cent on their electric bills. Mid-March
brought the first statewide blackouts, affecting some 1.5 million customers.
On March 27, customers of all three
Californian utilities began to see the financial effects of the situation, when
the CPUC authorised a rate increase of 3 cents per kilowatt hour (KWh), as well
as an emergency procurement surcharge of 1 cent/KWh. Meanwhile, demand remained
high, and blackouts continued to be a threat. On April 3, the CPUC ordered PG&E
and SCE to begin making payments to California for electricity purchases. FERC
began to order some power suppliers to refund tens of millions of dollars to
the utilities, but by now this was a drop in their ocean of debt.
The measures proved too late to prevent the
biggest financial casualty of the crisis, and on April 6, PG&E filed for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. A few days later, SCE signed a memorandum of
understanding (MOU) with the state, outlining the steps it had to take to
return to financial stability.
On April 25, FERC voted to allow some price
controls when energy supplies reached emergency levels. The California Assembly
authorised the creation of a state-owned power company that could produce
electricity at its own power plants, and sell the electricity at rates based on
production costs. But two days of record heat on May 7 and 8 led to rolling
blackouts, as suppliers proved unable to meet demand for electricity.
One tangle seemed to be resolved on June
18, as SDG&E signed an MOU with the state, ending its claim that customers
owed the firm $747 million to compensate for the difference between wholesale
and retail prices after the retail rate freeze. The company also agreed to sell
its transmission lines to the state for $1 billion, 2.3 times the book value of
the assets, if the deal were approved by the state legislature later in the
summer. But doubts emerged about the deal as the summer wore on, and it became
clear that apportioning the bills for the debacle between the taxpayer, residential
consumer, business consumer and so on would not come easily, however urgent the
need for resolution.
On June 18, FERC allowed Cal-ISO to
regulate wholesale prices on electricity sold to the state. The price cap is
effective until September 30, 2002, and is to be determined based on the cost
of generating power at the least efficient plant in the system. The controls
apply to electricity sold in several western states, not just California.
But on July 2, several outside producers
cancelled sales to California, citing uncertainty about the effects of price
restrictions passed in June. The next day, Davis suggested that utilities cut
voltage by 2.5 per cent for the remainder of the summer, to reduce peak demand.
By mid-summer 2001, it had become clear that while the crisis had lost some of
its immediacy, the wrangling over who was to blame and who will pick up the
bill is far from over.
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The Aftermath - so far
The implications of the crisis are all too
clear from this brief account: higher retail energy bills, rolling blackouts,
bankruptcies, state bailouts and political drama. PG&E took the most
drastic hit, when it filed for bankruptcy protection on April 6, 2001. SCE and
SDG&E were also squeezed financially, but so far have not filed for Chapter
11 protection. Instead, they have signed MOUs with California to work out plans
for returning the two companies to financial health. These agreements are
awaiting approval by the state legislature. Eventually, FERC and the US courts
are likely to oblige providers of wholesale power during the crisis to refund
some of their takings though probably only a small fraction of the $8.9
billion claimed by state officials.
The cost in any wider sense is difficult to
assess, but ranges from a conservative $16 billion to a figure of $50-80
billion according to some expert commentators. Worries are emerging, too, about
the long-term costs of some of the power supply contracts that the state
entered into in an attempt to defuse the crisis.
As Californias ratepayers are discovering to
their cost, nothing is more expensive than risk managing a crisis when it is
already raging.
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Timeline
May 2000:
The first signs of impending disaster surface, as California's power reserves
fall noticeably.
July:
SDG&E customers begin to receive electric bills that are significantly
higher than those from previous summers.
September 30:
PG&E and SCE's under-collections exceed $2.3 billion.
January 2001:
PG&E and SCE suspend payments to creditors and eliminate
dividend payments. Their credit ratings are downgraded to junk status.
January 17:
Rolling blackouts begin, primarily impacting customers on voluntary
interruptible programmes.
February 2:
Governor Gray Davis signs a law allowing the state to purchase power under
long-term contracts, and authorising bond issues to pay for the purchases.
February 14:
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) rules that California cannot
force private electricity generators to sell power to utilities, without
assurances that they will receive payment.
April 3:
PG&E and SCE are ordered by the Californian Public Utilities Commission
(CPUC) to begin making payments to California for electricity purchases.
April 6:
PG&E files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection.
April 9: SCE
signs a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the state, outlining the steps
it must take to return to financial stability.
May 7 & 8:
lang=EN-GB> Two days of record heat lead to rolling blackouts, as suppliers are
unable to meet demand for electricity.
May 15: CPUC
publishes its new rate structure, outlining price increases for customers of
PG&E and SCE.
June 18:
SDG&E signs a MOU with the state, ending its claim that customers owe the
firm $747 million and agreeing to sell its transmission lines to the state for
$1 billion (2.3 times book value). But the terms of the agreement are being
reviewed by the state's legislature, for approval by August 15 and this and
other plans for resolving the utilities under-collections are proving
contentious.
June 18:
FERC allows Cal-ISO, the independent system operator for California, to
regulate wholesale prices on electricity sold to the state. Price cap is
effective until September 30, 2002, and is to be determined based on the cost
of generating power at the least efficient plant in the system. Controls apply
to electricity sold in several western states, and not just California.
July 2:
Several outside producers cancel sales to California, citing uncertainty about
the effects of price restrictions passed in June.
This timeline was completed in July 2001. For the
latest events in this ongoing crisis, check out CNN.coms In-Depth Special
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Lisa Royan of Zurich IC Squared contributed this ERisk case study
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