The story
At the time of its accounting scandal,
Bausch & Lomb was one of the longest established companies in the US. It
was proud of a heritage that began as early as 1853, when John Bausch, a German
immigrant, set up an optical goods shop in Rochester, NY a city that remains
the headquarters of the modern company.
Through the 20th century the business made
many fundamental innovations in optical technology. It claims to have produced
the first optical quality glass made in the US, and to have made the lenses
that took the first satellite pictures of the moon. Early in the 20th century
it developed some of the earliest effective sunglasses, and from the early
1970s it brought to market some of the first soft contact lenses.
From the early 1980s, a more driven style
of management at Bausch & Lomb under new CEO Gill began to turn that
technical expertise into fast business growth. This growth was substantially
led by contact lens and lens care products, and by international sales of key
brands such as the classic Ray-Ban sunglasses. But these star performers also
lay at the heart of the companys developing problems in the early 1990s.
The contact lens divisions sales were
dominated by a type of soft contact lens known as SVS, designed to be worn for
around six months. However, since the mid-1980s, this kind of contact lens had
been inexorably losing market share to disposable contact lenses.
Bausch & Lomb had entered the market
for disposable lenses late because it had not wanted to cannibalise existing
product lines. As a result, the contact lens division found itself playing
catch-up in this developing market sector with some powerful rivals, notably
Johnson & Johnson.
During 1993, it became apparent that the
division was going to have difficulty maintaining its record of constantly
increasing sales and meeting the aggressive targets it had agreed with
corporate headquarters. Even more than in most companies, Bausch & Lomb
divisional executives knew that they would be judged in terms of whether they
made those numbers.
The contact lens division decided that it
might best be able to meet its targets if it concentrated all the sales of
old-style SVS soft contact lenses in the hands of its established third-party
distributors. This strategy was designed to allow the in-house direct sales
force to shift its attention to the product of the future: disposable contact
lenses. But, crucially, the strategy also concentrated SVS sales efforts within
a sales channel that could sign up to large inventories of contact lenses.
During the second half of 1993, the senior
executives of the contact lens division achieved their September quarterly
sales target by discounting the SVS product and thus selling large amounts to
key distributors. This made the task of meeting the December target even more
difficult.
The SEC enquiry later found that, to
achieve the December target, the contact lens division devised a sales &
marketing programme that, in effect, allocated vast numbers of contact lenses
to third-party distributors [3]. There was little demand among the distributors
for this inventory, but they were keen to retain their status as authorised
distributors of Bausch & Lomb products. They were also assured that sales
that in the past had been channelled to the direct sales team would now be
pushed towards the third-party distributors (this later turned out not to
happen to any useful degree).
A few distributors refused to accept the
terms of the sales programme, under which distributors were given Bausch &
Lomb credit lines for their inventory but were obliged to pay the money back
through 1994, mainly in a large balloon payment in the month of June.
The majority agreed to the programme but
demanded concessions from executives at various levels within the contact lens
division that, cumulatively, changed the nature of the programme and shifted
the economic responsibility for its success back to Bausch & Lomb.
For example, when some distributors said
they did not have the warehouse space to accept so many lenses, certain
executives within the contact lens division arranged interim facilities for
them. Existing credit lines were raised substantially in a way that led to some
significant credit exposures.
Worse still, promissory notes that senior
Bausch & Lomb managers had designed to ensure the company could demand
payment for the stock were, in many cases, left unsigned. And certain junior
executives within the division, under pressure to sign up the distributors,
began to promise distributors that they could return any contact lenses that
were not sold.
Later on, as the balloon payments became
due in summer 1994, this is precisely what happened. The distributors told
Bausch & Lomb that they had too much stock, forcing the company to
recognise the reality of the situation and, in June, to communicate some of the
bad news to investors. By October 1994, Bausch & Lomb had taken back a
substantial amount of the oversupply.
By that point, however, it had broken
accounting rules in its reporting for the 1993 financial year. These rules allow
a company to recognise sales before it receives payment for its goods or
services. But the rules say that sales must be accounted for in a way that
reflects their economic substance, not their form: revenue should not be
recognised in company statements until it is realised and earned.
All rules are subject to interpretation,
but SEC investigators were later in little doubt that Bausch & Lombs
December programme broke generally accepted accounting principles with regard
to revenue recognition.
In findings eventually published in 1997,
the SEC accepted that senior corporate managers at Bausch & Lomb did not
know about the realities of the December sales programme, as implemented at
various levels within the contact lens division. But the SEC said the company
had failed to maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to
ensure that it followed revenue recognition rules.
Investigations by business journalists as
the scandal developed, particularly those of Business Week, suggested
that the December programme was, in part, the outcome of a target-driven
corporate culture across Bausch & Lomb that emphasised headline results
above everything else [4]. Bausch & Lomb senior management denied that this
was a fair interpretation of the leadership style at the company, and
maintained that any problems at divisional level were aberrations.
During the summer of 1994, as the effects
of the December programme became apparent and Bausch & Lomb began to own up
to investors that its earnings for 1994 would be affected by surplus inventory,
the company was also becoming concerned about another star performer, the
Asia-Pacific division.
This $100-million revenue division had for
years provided some of the cream on the returns from Bausch & Lombs expanding
international operations. But by 1994, an increasing proportion of its earnings
was in the form of receivables or money owed rather than hard cash.
In June, Bausch & Lomb internal
auditors began work in the Hong Kong divisional headquarters, and, in August
1994, corporate managers back in Rochester were sent an anonymous letter from
Asia-Pacific division staff, which said that certain of their management had
been booking fraudulent sales.
Bausch & Lomb moved to strengthen the
audit team and brought in external auditors, who began an extended
investigation. By the autumn of 1994, they were uncovering an elaborate scheme
at the divisions Hong Kong offices to bump up sales of Ray-Ban and other
brands of sunglasses.
The mechanics of the fraud took various
forms, including both the assignment of sales to customers without their
knowledge, and the assignment of sales to compliant customers.
The motivation for the fraud might have
arisen out of strategic business challenges. Bausch & Lomb faced increasing
pressure from competition in its premium sunglasses sector, and from shifts in
eyeware fashion. An international grey market existed in branded goods that
could have been used to siphon away any excess inventory after sales targets
had been met, though this would have been against strict company policy.
Whatever the motivation, by the time the
investigators arrived, the situation had got out of hand. The perpetrators had
created a complex chain of paperwork to sustain their actions. The SEC investigation
found that Asia-Pacific personnel prepared false paperwork reflecting
non-existent transactions, including customer requests for exchange,
warehouse receipts and credit notes.
The customer requests for exchange of
sunglasses were important because they could be used to freshen up the
fraudulent transactions. They provided an excuse for the fact that cash
payments for the booked transactions were abnormally delayed. Without them, the
transactions would soon have begun to look like bad debts, and would have
attracted corporate attention. For the same reason, certain computer records
had been tampered with.
